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1. Introduction  
 
The overall objective of this working paper is to develop recommendations for 
restructuring the sugar sector in Ukraine taking into consideration international sugar 
market developments, future WTO membership of Ukraine and lessons from other 
Eastern European countries. 
 
The development of recommendations for the sugar sector has been requested by the 
1st Vice Minister Ivan Demtshak of the Ukraininan Ministry of Agriculture Policy based on 
the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers dated 24th December 2005 „On Approval for the 
Development of a Restructuring Programme for the Sugar and Sugar Beet Sectors for 
the Period until 2010“. The analysis and development of recommendations involved 
various experts from the private and public sector in Ukraine and Germany. The German 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture provided expertise to report on the latest developments of 
the reform of the EU sugar market. The sugar industry in Germany provided valuable 
information on the restructuring of the sugar sector in Eastern Germany, Moldova and 
Poland as well as on recent world market trends. The sugar industry and sugar beet 
growers in Ukraine have been involved with the Ukrainian Agrarian Confederation and 
the Ukrainian Sugar Association UKRZUKOR. The project team took part in various 
meetings, seminars and conferences to identify the needs of the sector. The project 
team further analysed various statistics provided by Ukrainian public authorities, 
available at the Institute and various other sources. This work builts upon previous 
studies of the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting as well as policy 
papers of the German Advisory Group. The study team significantly extended the 
analysis of the issues by applying different methods at farm and factory level. This 
concerns in particular analysis of gross margins, efficiency coefficients and density 
functions. 
 
The paper first analyses the current state of the sugar sector in Ukraine with its 
production and consumption, efficiency, market regulations and trade. The study team 
put particular emphasis on the analysis of the variation of efficiency in sugar beet and 
sugar production at different locations as well as between different sugar beet growers 
and sugar factories in Ukraine.  
 
The international part of the working paper starts with a description of recent world 
market trends and the impact of the EU sugar market reform. Three case studies from 
Poland, Eastern Germany and Moldova complete the picture with important experiences 
and lessons learnt. The study ends with conclusions and specific recommended actions 
for the Ukrainian Government.  
 
The analyses of future energy market opportunities for the sugar industry, impact on 
input markets (seed, fertilizers, agro-chemicals) as well as the analysis of isoglucose 
markets were outside the scope of this study.  
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2 The sugar sector in Ukraine 
2.1 Sugar beet production 
Sugar beet has been the major resource base for domestic sugar factories. Thus, the 
competitiveness and efficiency of sugar beet production in Ukraine is one of the most 
important questions to be considered for sustaining the whole sugar value chain. 
Despite high production of the sector during the Soviet times (Ukraine was the biggest 
producer of sugar and consequently of sugar beet in the former USSR), transition to the 
market became the real challenge for beet sugar production. Due to loss of former Soviet 
Union markets and limited international competitiveness production of sugar beet fell by 
almost two-thirds since the beginning of transition, from 44.3 m t of sugar beets in 1990 
to 15.6 m t in 2005 (table 1).          
Table 1: Production of sugar beet in Ukraine, 1990-2005 
 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
Seeding areas, 
thd ha  
1605.4 1022.1 855.6 970.3 896.6 773.4 732.0 625.5 667.0 
Yield (simple 
average), t/ha 
27.57 15.63 17.67 18.26 18.93 20.12 23.80 24.97 22.53 
Gross harvest, 
m tons  
44.3 14.1 13.2 15.6 14.5 13.3 16.6 15.6 15.4 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Ukragroconsult  
* 2006 preliminary estimates 
 
This decline, however, has not been stable. After the ever-lowest harvest in 2000 the 
sector somewhat improved its performance, yet, there has been no clear positive trend. 
However, slightly increasing seeding areas and growing yields look encouraging, 
signalling some positive adjustments in the sector.  
It should be noted that yield records in Table 1 are only simple average estimates and 
they do not capture the whole variability of yields within the sector. The weighted 
average yield (weighted by the production shares) provides more accurate estimates, 
which, according to our estimations was considerably higher than simple average in 
2004, i.e. 30.91 t/ha versus 24.97 t/ha.   
The estimated distribution of yields in 2004 (Figure 1) shows a huge dispersion, with a 
bulk of producers ranging from very low yields to some 30-40t/ha, and a few achieving 
yields of 40t/ha or more. The mode of the distribution is at 16.95t/ha, showing that the 
majority of producers had yields in the proximity of that estimate in 2004. If we consider 
the areas under sugar beet grouped according to the yield bands (as in Table 2), one 
would notice a positive correlation between the areas harvested and yields. In other 
words, producers cultivating more sugar beet were capable to achieve higher yields.  
However, this result should not be mis-interpreted to assume that large-scale production 
of sugar beets is generally more productive, since as Table 2 also witnesses, producers 
having the same land area under sugar beets perform differently, with yields belonging 
to the “worst” as well as to the “best” performing producers.     
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Figure 1: Estimated distribution1 of farm 
sugar beet yields, 2004 
 
Source: Own estimations based on IER database 
Table 2: Distribution of areas 
harvested according to yield bands, 
2004 
Area harvested, ha Yield, 
t/ha 
Min Mode  Mean Max 
0÷10 2 19.7 63.9 2437 
10÷20 1 30.1 100.6 1823 
20÷30 1 60.0 147.8 2265 
30÷40 2 68.3 194.4 3854 
40÷50 2 105.4 275.7 1615 
>50 10 114.7 309.1 2114 
Source: Own estimations based on IER database 
 
Figure 2 shows the estimated distribution of farm level output technical efficiency scores 
in the sector2. Efficiency scores show how far producers are located from the best 
producers given production costs they have. In other words, the best producers have 
100% efficiency (‘1’ efficiency score as in Figure 2), the worst producers are located to 
the left from 1. So, if a producer has 0.8 efficiency score (or 80% efficient), it is said that 
he can expand the output by 20% further at the same costs by improved farm practice, 
adjusting capital/labour ratios and enhanced farm management.  
As Figure 2 reveals, the majority of sugar beet producers are only efficient at a level of 
43%. Despite a slightly higher weighted average efficiency score (59%), it is evident that 
domestic producers underutilise their potential, or use resources at hand inefficiently.  It 
occurs due to various reasons, e.g. poor farm management, sub-optimal farm practices 
(low quality seeds, high seeding density, low input use), inadequate machinery etc. 
outside the scope of this paper.  So potentially, provided enhanced efficiency, Ukraine 
could have produced about 26.94 m t of sugar beet, i.e. about 10 m t more than actually 
produced, at the same costs in 2004.   
Figures 3 and 4 provide information on the costs of producing sugar beets. One might 
notice that the majority of farms invested about UAH123/t or UAH 2392/ha of sugar 
beet. The average figure was about UAH176/t or UAH 2782/ha of sugar beet in 2004. 
The distribution of costs is rather broad, ranging somewhat near UAH 1000/ha to more 
than 5000 UAH/t. Unsurprisingly, producers putting more money into production received 
higher yields. Table 3 shows a positive correlation between production costs and yields 
(i.e. mode and mean of the production costs distribution of each yield band show a 
positive trend). So, producers achieving more than 50t/ha yield spent UAH5532/ha, and 
the majority within this yield band spent UAH5177/ha.  
In a further step we compared the above production costs with world market prices to 
infer whether and how many sugar beet farmers would be competitive on world markets, 
assuming an efficient sugar processing industry. Figure 3 shows the theoretical sugar 
beet world market price (UAH165/t) deducted from the sugar world market price 
(EUR192/t) in 2004 assuming an average EU extraction rate coefficient (13%). It may be 
concluded that about half of the Ukrainian sugar beet growers would have been produced 
competitively.     
From the above analysis it can be concluded that a huge efficiency potential exists not 
only through investments but also through improved farm practices and farm 
management. It may further be concluded that discussions on average production costs 
are of limited use because of the broad variation of production costs.  
                                                 
1 We used kernel density estimation using Gaussian density as a kernel function (see Annex A.1 for details) 
2 Technical efficiency scores were estimated using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) with one output (Output) – 
two inputs (Land, Gross value of inputs) model. Ffor the method description see Annexes A.2 and A.3 
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Figure 2: Estimated distribution of 
farm efficiency scores, 2004 
Source: Own estimations based on IER database 
Figure 3: Estimated distribution of sugar 
beet production costs per ton, 2004 
 
Source: Own estimations based on IER database 
Figure 4: Estimated distribution of 
production costs per hectare, 2004 
Source: Own estimations based on IER database 
Table 3: Distribution of production costs 
according to yield bands, 2004  
Production costs, UAH/ha Yield, t/ha 
Mode  Mean 
0÷10 1442 1814 
10÷20 2184 2468 
20÷30 2732 3050 
30÷40 3792 3874 
40÷50 4399 4627 
>50 5177 5532 
Source: Own estimations based on IER database 
 
Analysing the regional pattern and efficiency of sugar beet production map 1 shows that 
production is mostly concentrated in the Central part of Ukraine. Vinnytska, Poltavska, 
Cherkasksa, Kyivska have been the leading oblasts by volumes and land areas under 
sugar beet. The same relates to yields, except Kherson oblast, which gives the highest 
weighted average yield. However, the efficiency of production scores does not go in line 
with other figures among oblasts on the map. For example, Dnipropetrovsk region had 
approximately the same efficiency score as Vinnytska or Poltavska oblasts in 2004, 
although natural conditions are less favorable for sugar beet growing in Dnipropetrovsk. 
Although it would require additional studies to analyse this phenomenon in detail, one 
conclusion is still possible:  availability of good natural potential does not necessarily 
guarantee efficient use of it.     
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Map 1: Regional distribution of sugar beet production in Ukraine 
 
Source: Own presentation and estimates using IER database 
 
 
2.2 Competitiveness of sugar beet production vis-à-vis other 
crops 
 
The relative competitiveness of sugar beet production against other crops plays a 
decisive role in the future of the sugar production value chain. The trend shown in Table 
1 is mainly explained by the fact that Ukrainian farmers have been reducing the seeding 
areas under sugar beet opting for more profitable and less capital-intensive crops such as 
grains and oil seeds. So, it is important to know conditions (price, yields etc.) under 
which sugar beet production is competitive within Ukrainian farms from the farmers’ 
point of view.  
To analyse competitiveness of sugar beet production we apply gross margin calculations.  
The gross margin per hectare is defined as the revenue per hectare plus any revenues 
from the sale of by-products plus any relevant subsidies per hectare, minus the sum of 
all variable costs. The results show the marginal competitiveness of crops, i.e. if a 
farmer had additional land and other production factors available the gross margin 
would give him an indication in which crop to invest. In the long-term perspective, 
however, gross margins must be adjusted for fixed costs such as purchasing machinery 
or labor costs. Due to the data limitation at hand we are not able to extract a ‘clean’ 
gross margin figure. For example, data on revenues from the sale of by-products and 
the potential impact on subsequent crops are lacking. However, we can approximate 
gross margins with a sufficient degree of accuracy required for the comparison of the 
profitability of different crops (see Annex C for data description).  We carried out these 
calculations for six crops: sugar beet, sunflower seed, rapeseed, wheat, barley, and 
corn.  
 
From the results presented in Figure 5 to 8 we may draw the following conclusions. 
Figure 5 shows that other crops outperformed sugar beet in terms of gross margin in 
2004. More probability mass is located in the negative segment of the gross margin 
scale, suggesting that producers have greater risks of incurring losses with sugar beet 
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vis-à-vis other crops. The ‘champions’, as expected, were sunflower and rape seed. Of 
course, as figure 5 shows, there are some producers having similar gross margins with 
sugar beet as with other crops, but this can be achieved under the conditions considered 
below. 
Location-specific factors (soil, rainfall distribution) are expected to be important, 
suggesting that sugar beet might be more competitive vis-à-vis other crops in the most 
favorable sugar beet growing areas. Unfortunately, we did not find justification for such 
argument. We analysed Vinnytska oblast – the leading area in terms of sugar beet 
production and natural conditions for sugar beet growing (see Figure 6) – and compared 
gross margin scores for crops in that oblast. As a result we received a similar picture as 
for the whole Ukraine. Sugar beet gross margin distribution for Vinnytska oblast shows a 
similar pattern compared to the whole Ukraine pattern. The only exception is rapeseed, 
clearly improving its competitiveness in this oblast. Two important conclusions follow 
from these results. First, favorable nature conditions for sugar beet growing might not 
necessarily lead to higher competitiveness. Second, provided that the sugar beet 
production performance indicators do not improve, other crops (especially rape seed) 
will gradually ‘squeeze out’ sugar beet production. 
 
Figure 5: Estimated distributions of gross 
margins for different crops in Ukraine 
 
Source: Own presentation based on IER database 
Figure 6: Estimated distributions of 
gross margins for different crops in 
Vinnytska oblast 
Source: Own presentation based on IER database 
Figure 7: Estimated distributions of gross 
margins for sugar beet within different 
yield bands in Ukraine 
 
Source: Own presentation based on IER database 
Figure 8: Estimated distributions of 
gross margins for sugar beet within 
‘>50 t/ha’ yield band vs. other 
crops 
Source: Own presentation based on IER database 
 
If we group gross margins of sugar beet production according to the yield bands (see 
Figure 7) it becomes obvious that high yield producers having higher scores. Figure 7 
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shows that if we move from the lowest to the highest yield bands we receive more 
probability mass in the positive sector of the gross margin scale. Moreover, as Figure 8 
witnesses, sugar beet production achieving more than 50t/ha yield might be even more 
competitive than, say, rape seed or sunflower seed from the farmers perspective. These 
results are basically consistent with previous studies, for example Benecke and Cramon-
Taubadel (2001).  This leads to the conclusion that increasing sugar beet yields is a 
necessary pre-condition to sustain sugar beet and sugar production in Ukraine. 
Efficiency gains in sugar beet production are a key element to make the whole sugar 
production value chain more efficient. However, the interpretation of gross margins as a 
competitiveness indicator on farm level should not be mis-interpreted with international 
competitiveness. Even with efficient sugar beet production beet sugar production is 
uncompetitive from the national point of view, because in this view the costs of national 
sugar production, including sugar beet production, have to be compared with 
opportunity costs on world markets (see secton 3 for further details).  
  
2.3 Structure of the sugar beet producers 
There are more than 3000 agricultural enterprises producing sugar beet in Ukraine. 
However, as Table 4 shows, their share in the total production volume gradually 
decreased in the course of transition to about 77%, and households produced the rest of 
23% in 2004. Most of the enterprises producing sugar beet are private (75% of the total 
volume in 2004) for the time being, whereas the state owned enterprises produced 
about 1.5% of the total sugarbeet volume. Table 4 also provides some information on 
the shares of each enterprise type in the total production where private companies take 
the leading position producing about 42%. These are joint stock or limited liability 
companies, increasingly vertically integrated with sugar holdings processing and 
marketing sugar.  
Table 4: Structure of sugar beet producers by production shares, % 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Agricultural Enterprises 97.4 87.8 79.7 73.8 77.4 76.9 
Private: Na Na Na Na Na 75.3 
Companies (of different 
types) 
Na Na Na Na Na 42.1 
Private farms Na Na Na Na Na 22.4 
Cooperatives  Na Na Na Na Na 7.2 
Others Na Na Na Na Na 3.6 
State: Na Na Na Na Na 1.5 
Households 2.6 12.2 20.3 26.2 22.6 23.1 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine and own estimates based on IER database 
2.4 Sugar production 
Ukraine inherited from the former USSR a huge sugar industry with almost 200 sugar 
factories producing more than 5 m tons of refined sugar per year in the beginning of the 
transition.  However, in the course of transition the sector output dropped below 1.8 m 
tons, recovering somewhat to 1.91 m tons last year. From the sugar balance in table 5 
we might infer that current domestic production of beet sugar is not sufficient to cover 
domestic demand, placing Ukraine in a net-import situation.     
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Table 5: Sugar balance in Ukraine, 2002-2005 marketing years, m t 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Beginning stocks 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.15 
Production of refined beet sugar 1.41 1.44 1.77 1.91 
Import of cane sugar 1.34 0.59 0.50 0.45 
Production of refined cane sugar 0.74 0.68 0.48 0.21 
Total domestic production 2.15 2.12 2.25 2.12 
Total import 1.72 0.97 0.68 0.60 
TOTAL SUPPLY 2.67 2.62 2.32 2.59 
Total export 0.50 0.33 0.32 0.30 
Domestic industrial consumption 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.73 
Domestic human consumption  1.48 1.48 1.47 1.47 
TOTAL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION 2.05 2.11 2.14 2.19 
Ending stocks  0.12 0.17 0.15 0.10 
Source: UkrAgroConsult(2005) 
 
The efficiency of the sugar value chain depends on sugar beet production as raw 
material, but also on the efficiency of sugar processing itself. The number and density of 
sugar factories in Ukraine is extremely high compared with other European countries 
(Zorya and Nivyevskiy, 2005). For example, Vinnytska oblast has about 35  (23 
operating so far),  whereas Germany (with about twice the Ukrainian production 
volume) has only 26 sugar factories. Out of 190 factories, 119 are currently operating 
and 71 sugar factories are closed. 30 sugar factories have already been liquidated so 
that the total number of sugar factories in Ukraine is currently 160. The remaining 
factories effectively operate less than 90 days per campaign/year leading to huge fixed 
costs of production and thus lower competitiveness. The average sugar plant in Ukraine 
processes about 2700 tons of sugar beet per day, which is about three times less than in 
Europe. Only 14 out of the 119 left factories in Ukraine have more than 5000 t daily 
capacity. The average daily capacity of the restructured East Germany sugar industry is 
about 11000 t per day.  
As the competitiveness of sugar production – besides cost efficient production of sugar 
beets - is mainly determined by realising economies of scale by maximising the number 
of campaign days, the daily capacity of the processing plant and the efficient use of 
energy, it is evident that the sugar industry itself has to significantly improve efficieny.  
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Map 2: Distribution of sugar factories in Ukraine 
Source: Zuckerwirtschaft Europa (2006) 
 
Table 5: Some performance indicators of the sugar industry in Ukraine, 2004 
Number of 
factories *) Oblast 
Procured 
sugar 
beets, m 
MT 
Processed 
sugar 
beets, m MT 
Production 
sugar, m 
MT 
Extraction 
coeff., % 
Avg. daily 
capacity, 
KMT 
Avg. 
campaign 
period 
per 
factory, 
days Operated Closed 
Vinnytsia 2.5 2.4 0.3 10.9 1.9 64.3 23 17 
Volyn 0.9 0.8 0.1 12.2 3.8 62.3 4 0 
Zhytomyr 0.6 0.6 0.1 11.2 1.9 66.8 5 1 
Kyiv 1.7 1.6 0.2 11.4 2.0 67.1 14 2 
Kirovograd 0.6 0.6 0.1 12.2 2.6 58.8 4 7 
Lviv 0.5 0.5 0.1 11.8 3.8 43.1 3 2 
Mykolaiv 0.2 0.2 0.0 10.8 5.0 58.8 1 1 
odessa 0.5 0.5 0.0 10.5 2.9 61.1 3 0 
Poltava 1.6 1.6 0.2 11.9 2.8 78.5 8 3 
Rivne 0.5 0.5 0.1 11.8 2.4 59.6 4 2 
Sumy 0.7 0.6 0.1 12.6 1.9 63.0 6 11 
Ternopil 1.4 1.3 0.1 11.0 3.7 49.4 8 1 
Kharkiv 1.6 1.6 0.2 12.1 2.6 75.6 10 2 
Khmelnyts
kiy 0.9 0.9 0.1 11.5 2.2 44.3 10 6 
Cherkasy 1.2 1.2 0.1 10.8 2.2 60.4 10 13 
Chernihiv 0.5 0.5 0.1 12.8 1.6 85.5 4 1 
Chernivtsi 0.2 0.2 0.0 11.0 2.4 43.8 2 2 
UKRAINE 16.0 15.5 1.8 11.6 2.7 61.3 119 71 
Source: Ukrtsukor (2005)    *) 30 are liquidated 
Current capacity of the Ukrainian sugar industry is estimated at 0.32 m tons of sugar 
beets per day, or around 37 thd tons of refined sugar per day. So, to process the 2004 
harvest, provided full capacity utilization, Ukrainian sugar plants would have needed 
around 50 days. However, due to practical technical problems, the sugar campaign 
lasted about 61 days (see table 5).  
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Looking particularly at the variability of sugar production performance indicators 
provides additional insights. Figure 9 shows the estimated distribution of the plant beet 
sugar production volumes. The majority of factories produced around the vicinity of 12.4 
KMT in the 2004 campaign, although there was a group producing around the vicinity of 
40 KMT and one refinery produced more than 60 KMT.  
 
In the next step we analyzed those factories located in the shadowed area of the 
production scale (because of incomplete data sets). Altogether, the chosen factories 
produced about 70% of the total sugar output in 2004. The results show that although 
there were several factories over-utilizing their capacities the majority of factories 
utilized their daily capacities by around 91%, and the average capacity utilization score 
was 82.6% in the 2004 campaign.   
 
The sugar extraction coefficient may be taken as a further efficiency indicator of sugar 
beet processing in Ukraine. As Figure 11 shows it is characterized by broad variability 
and is ranging from about 7% to some 13% within the group considered in the 2004 
campaign. The majority of factories had 11.65% extraction coefficient and the average 
was about 11% within the group considered. This is comparatively low by international 
standards. Low sugar content in sugar beets is probably one reason; on the other hand 
the broad variation of extraction coefficients (from 7% to 14%) proves the high potential 
for efficiency improvements of factories in Ukraine.  
 
The distribution of plant campaign days gives an indication of the provision of factories 
with sugar beets. Figure 12 shows a huge variability. Some factories processed sugar 
beets in less than a month, but some were able to operate more than a hundred days. 
The majority of factories within the group considered operated about 71 days, and the 
average campaign was 66 days. As the number of campaign days is one of the decisive 
factors of the profitability of sugar production also this result shows a high potential for 
improvement of raw material supply. 
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Figure 9:  Estimated distribution of plant 
beet sugar production 
 
Source: Own presentation 
Figure 10: Estimated distribution of 
daily plant beet sugar production to 
capacity ratio 
 
Source: Own presentation 
Figure 11: Estimated distribution of 
plant sugar extraction coefficient 
 
Source: Own presentation 
Figure 12 Estimated distribution of 
plant campaign days 
Source: Own presentation 
 
 
2.5 Structure of the sugar industry 
The sugar industry in Ukraine has been fully privatized. Table 6 shows the current 
structure of the sector. There are two leading sugar holdings producing about 25 % of 
the market share, followed by some medium-sized companies. Despite fewer sugar 
processing plants in possession, UkrRos seems more technologically advanced than UPK, 
having close to its rival market share figures. The same applies to the quickly growing 
companies Astarta-Kyiv and UkrPromInvest. None of the companies has a dominating 
market share. Foreign investors have been kept outside for the time being. 
The leading sugar holdings can be characterized as financially strong, usually also 
involved in other businesses and sectors. Vertical integration is increasing with a 
tendency to extend operations from sugar production and marketing also to sugar beet 
production to ensure raw material supply as the decisive factor for making the whole 
value chain profitable.  
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Table 6 The structure of the sugar industry in Ukraine, 2004 and 2006 
COMPANY (MAJOR SHARE HOLDER) No. of 
plants 2004 
No. of 
plants 2006 
Production 
of sugar, 
KMT 
Market 
share, % 
2004 
Ukrainska prodovolcha kompania 
(UPK) 
15 - 229.22 
12.82 
UkrRos 6 - 198.71 11.11 
Astarta-Kyiv  3 5 79.09 4.42 
UkrPromInvest/Agroprodinvest  2 5 75.98 4.25 
Dubnotsukor 6  67.85 3.79 
SumyAgroTsukor 4  50.92 2.85 
InTsukorProm-K 3  49.19 2.75 
Euroservice-Ukraine 3  45.42 2.54 
Salivonky sugar plant 1  41.14 2.30 
Lokhvytskiy sugar plant 1  38.71 2.16 
Other producers 75  911.92 51.00 
Source: Ukrtsukor 
2.6 Sugar market organization in Ukraine and trade regime 
Table 7: Basic characteristics of the Sugar Market Organization in Ukraine 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
    
Domestic marketing quota (“A”) m tons 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Minimum prices:    
     Sugar beet UAH/t 165.0 165.0 170.0 
     White sugar (wholesale, including VAT) UAH/t 2370.0 2370.0 2370.0 
Import Duty:     
Sugar 50%, not 
less €300/t 
50%, not 
less €300/t 
50%, not 
less €300/t 
Sugar beet 50%, not 
less €125/t 
50%, not 
less €125/t 
20% 
Sugar beet seeds €22/kg €22/kg €22/kg 
Machinery 10-40% 10-40% 10% 
Source: Own presentation based on Ukrainian legislation  
 
The sugar market organization in Ukraine emulates the EU’s sugar market regime, but 
without export subsidies. The sugar quota was introduced in 20003 allocating the overall 
national quota annually to regions and then to sugar factories and sugar beet growers 
within each particular region. The allocation of quota has been exercised not on a 
competitive basis, but according to the Ministry of Agriculture Policy regulation. The main 
criterion is the contracted sugar beet area per region explaining partly the above 
tendency towards vertical integration. The quota is not tradable so far, forcing inefficient 
factories to further produce although it does not make sense either financially (from the 
factory’ s point of view) or economically (from the national economy’ s point of view).  
Each year the Government sets the minimum price of white sugar and derives the sugar 
beet price. Minimum prices are mandatory and if any agent diverts from minimum prices, 
he is substantially fined. In fact, the volume of quota and minimum prices remained 
unchanged since 2002.4 In order to protect high domestic prices, the import tariffs are 
set at a prohibitively high level (300 €/ton). The fundamental difference between the 
situation in the EU and that in Ukraine is that the former has a net sugar surplus, while 
                                                 
3 The Law of Ukraine No. 758-XIV “On State Regulation of Sugar Production and Marketing” as of 
June 17, 1999. 
4 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine # 1977 “On State Regulation of Sugar 
Production and Marketing”, as of December 25, 2002 (with amendments). 
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the latter is a net importer of sugar. Since domestic sugar production in Ukraine is lower 
than domestic consumption, from year to year the Government set temporary import 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) with very low in-tariff rates. In 2003, for example, the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine authorized TRQ totaling 560 KMT: 200 KMT with a specific 
import duty of EUR60/t, and additional 360 KMT at EUR6/t. The TRQ for raw cane sugar 
was auctioned. This method will have to be changed in future to make it consistent with 
WTO rules.  
Domestic market prices usually equaled minimum prices, which were twice over the 
indicative world market prices (Figure 15). However, mostly due to fact that there was no 
TRQ opened last year domestic prices surged much higher minimum prices. In the 
beginning of 2006 there is no TRQ as well and current price jump has also been heated 
by a considerable world market price increase. 
 
Figure 10 Domestic and world market 
sugar prices, Sep. 2004 – Apr. 2006 
 
Source: Ukragroconsult, APK-Inform 
Table 8 Tariff rate quotas for the 
import of raw cane sugar in Ukraine 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 
Note: The auctions are held on a competitive base. 
However, eligible for auctioning participants have 
to pay an accreditation fee, an auction duty, and 
transfer in advance the established minimum price 
of one lot (e.g. €600,000 per lot (10,000 tons) in 
2003) to a special account at the State Treasury. 
Successful bidders settled the difference.  
Purchased lots could not be traded.  None of the 
applicants could buy more than 50 per cent of the 
import volume, and 20 per cent of the tariff rate 
quota was reserved for new entrants. 
Year Established 
quota, KMT 
Actual 
imports, 
KMT 
1998 300 96 
1999 60 217 
2000 260 229 
2001 260 260 
2003 560 380 
2004 125 125 
2005 - - 
2006 - - 
 
Also, raw sugar can get to Ukraine on tolling contracts, with further mandatory re-export 
of refined cane sugar. For example, in the 2003/04 marketing year Ukraine imported 646 
thousand tons of raw sugar using the tolling scheme (Zorya and Nivyevskiy, 2005). Only 
299 thousand tons were re-exported, leaving 347 thousand tons in the country. This is 
achieved by re-exporting “empty” wagons of refined sugar or by artificially lowering the 
extracting coefficient from raw sugar (which is normally 95%). Finally, high domestic 
prices in Ukraine and high out-of-quota tariffs encourage sugar smuggling. The amount 
of illegal imports fluctuates in a range of 200-400 thousand tons of cane sugar per year. 
As Table 7 shows Ukraine had prohibitive import tariffs on sugar beet until 2005, which 
effectively restricted trade. However, in the beginning of 2005 in the course of WTO 
membership preparations Ukraine reduced most of its agricultural tariffs, including sugar 
beet. So, with the beginning of the 2005/2006 campaign the first ever imports of sugar 
beets arrived for processing. According to the official statistics about 113 thd tons of 
sugar beets were imported from September 2005 to January 2006. Imports came from 
Belarus (71 thd tons), Poland (21 thd tons) and Lithuania (20 thd tons).  Since the 
Government of Ukraine is determined to increase the minimum price to UAH195/t 
(EUR32/t), but EU gradually cuts its sugar beet price to EUR25/t it is very likely that 
sugar beet imports will take place further.  
The situation with sugar import tariffs is different. The Ukrainian Government was not yet 
able cutting its prohibitively high tariff rate (see Table 7). As a result, the legal import 
mostly takes place when there is a tariff rate quota or when world prices are high 
enough, e.g. as it was last summer. The major exporters of sugar to Ukraine (including 
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raw cane sugar) were Brazil, Cuba, United States, Germany, UK, Poland, and Belarus 
(see Table 8). The small amount of export of Ukrainian sugar has been limited to CIS 
countries.      
3 Competitiveness of sugar production in Ukraine before and 
after WTO membership 
Despite relatively favorable current market conditions for the sugar industry, it seems 
that future WTO membership of Ukraine would be a real challenge for the current sugar 
market organization in Ukraine. It seems that the protection of the sugar industry does 
not lead to serious restructuring and improved competitiveness. According to the 
preliminary results of the WTO negotiation process, Ukraine is going to provide a tariff-
rate quota for raw sugar at 260 thousand tons (although some countries have been 
insisting on 400 thousand tons) to be imported at 2% import duty. Out-of-quota tariff 
would decrease to 50%. Moreover, Ukraine together with other WTO members can 
already now anticipate further restrictions on its sugar market organization in the case of 
a successful completion of the Doha round negotiations. Most likely the Swiss formula5 of 
tariff reduction will be adopted, meaning a further sharp cut in sugar import duty.  
Table 9 comparative summaries of Doha Round offers on agriculture (market 
access) by EU, US and G-20 
Market 
access 
EU US G-20 
Tariff 
reductions 
Tariff level: 
0-30% = 20% cut 
30-60% = 30% cut 
60-90%  = 40% cut 
90% + = 50% cut 
Tariff level: 
0-20% = cut of 55% to 65% 
20-40% = cut of 65% to 75% 
40-60%  = cut of 75% to 85% 
60% + = cut of 85% to 90% 
Tariff level: 
0-20% = 45%  
20-50% = 55% cut 
50-75%  = 65% cut 
75% + = 75% cut 
Tariff cap 100% 75% 100% 
Sensitive 
products 
Max. 8% of tariff lines Max. 1% of tariff lines - 
Source: Agra Europe (2005c) 
According to these proposals Ukraine may face further sugar import tariff cuts from 30% 
to 85%, meaning effective import tariff at 38-27% after completion of the Doha round 
and WTO membership. Ukraine would most likely negotiate sugar as a ‘sensitive’ product 
to avoid maximum tariff cuts, but new tariff quotas would have to be opened to 
compensate exporters and guarantee market access (Agra Europe, 2005c). This means 
that in a case of treating sugar as ‘sensitive product’ Ukraine would be required to 
increase its sugar tariff rate quota (probably to 400 KMT). 
Furthermore, domestic support will be subject to reductions, meaning the ‘amber’ box 
constraints for Ukraine. All these future constraints imply that it is hard to imagine that 
the sugar market organization in Ukraine will not further change. 
 
Figures 15 and 16 provide graphical presentations whether Ukraine’s sugar industry is 
competitiveness under different world vs. domestic sugar price ratios. For detailed 
information on how these diagrams were built please refer to the Annex B. Consider first 
Figure 15 with current effective sugar import tariff at EUR300/t. If we take the last 
summer world vs. domestic sugar price ratio (e.g. point July 15, 2005), when domestic 
prices surged by 75%6 Ukraine’s sugar industry becomes on average uncompetitive since 
imports become profitable. Of course the most efficient producers might survive in such a 
situation. A similar situation happened in the beginning of this year, when domestic 
prices surged again (see the point March 03, 2006), but accompanied by significant world 
market price increases. In this case we find domestic sugar industry competitive. 
However, assuming that WTO accession most likely would leave Ukraine with 50% import 
tariff only, this will put more pressure on its sugar industry. Figure 16 basically illustrates 
the same result as Figure 15 under the reduced import tariff and the same price ratios. 
However, one very important conclusion could be drawn: Ukraine’s sugar industry 
                                                 
5 Swiss Formula means higher tariffs are cut more than lower tariffs. 
6 Year over year calculation 
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protection is very vulnerable to low world market sugar prices. Currently world market 
conditions with high prices are relatively favorable for the industry, however it will not 
last forever. Sooner or later world sugar prices will return to their equilibrium, implying a 
real challenge for Ukraine’s sugar industry, provided no significant restructuring taking 
place by that time.   
     
Figure 11: Sugar market regime before 
WTO membership 
 
Source: Own presentation 
Figure 12: Sugar market regime after 
WTO membership 
 
Source: Own presentation 
 
 
4 Further considerations: economic costs, employment, 
inflation, and poverty 
4.1 Consumers’ transfer to sugar producers 
World market price has always been the opportunity cost for consumers of a commodity 
in any country. In other words, this is the cost of a commodity that consumers would 
pay provided no production of that commodity takes place in a country. The same 
applies to sugar. The economic costs of border protection can be measured comparing 
domestic prices with import parity prices. However, there is no such term as “one world 
market price” in the sugar world (von Cramon-Taubadel, 1999). There are many of them 
depending on different factors such as quality and refinement of sugar, marketing 
terms, etc. The most frequently used price as an indicator of the world sugar price is so 
called ISA (International Sugar Organization) price, being the average of several raw-
sugar prices. Raw sugar is traded more intensively than white sugar, because white 
sugar is very sensitive to long distance transportation. The ISA price is lower than the 
white sugar price on the London Exchange (LIFFE) that is shown in figure 13.  
As figure 13 shows domestic sugar prices are much higher than indicative world sugar 
market prices, demonstratingthat consumers support domestic sugar producers in 
Ukraine. In order to quantify this support we calculated the import parity price of white 
sugar on a domestic market and compared it to the domestic white sugar price. Table 10 
provides a detailed description of these calculations. The choice of white sugar price at 
European ports as a relevant world or border price reflects the real situation with white 
sugar import options for Ukraine. Moreover OECD uses these border prices in its 
Producer Support Equivalent (PSE) calculations not only for Ukraine, but for many other 
Black Sea basin countries. Since Ukrainian white sugar is of relatively lower quality, it 
could be sold only at discount.  We accounted for this fact as well.  
 
Table 10 The estimation of consumers’ transfer to the Ukrainian sugar industry  
  2004 2005 
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Domestic Consumption, m t 2.15 2.19 
Domestic Price (minimum price), UAH/t 2370.00 2998.41 
Import parity (reference) price, UAH/t: 1744.53 1818.82 
Border reference price*, USD/t  239.54 261.00 
Official exchange rate, UAH/USD 5.30 5.05 
Handling and processing costs, UAH/t 184.21 197.63 
Import VAT, % 20.00 20.00 
Market price differential, UAH/t 625.47 1179.59 
Consumers’ transfer to sugar producers, m UAH 1341.64 2583.30 
Source: Own calculations; Notes: *-White sugar, Paris, European ports in bags of 50 kg; 
The volume of the transfer is considerably high in a country with a high share of food 
products in the consumer basket (64 %). Table 10 shows that consumers transferred to 
sugar producers more than UAH 1.3 and 2.5 bn per year in 2004 and 2005 respectively 
by paying the price for the protection of the domestic sugar industry.    
4.2 Sugar price and poverty 
As Table 11 demonstrates each citizen of Ukraine transferred UAH28.36 and UAH55.02 to 
sugar producers in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Although the daily transfer its not that 
high, i.e. 8 and 15 kopecks respectively it should be considered that Ukraine is a country 
with a relatively high share of poor people. According to IER poverty study7 11.79% of 
the whole Ukrainian population are considered as ‘poor’ if we apply the ‘one dollar per 
day’ absolute poverty line. However, the same study estimated the Income Gap Ratio 
(IGR) at 21.13%, showing the depth of the poverty. In other words, the IGR at the 
poverty line `one dollar per day´ indicates that on average poor households in this group 
were 21.13% below the poverty threshold, or lived for UAH4.18 per day (0.83 cents per 
day) in 2004. We assumed the same order of magnitude in 2005, implying the same 
figures. So dividing the average income of poor group population (according to the 
poverty line chosen) by consumers’ transfers per capita per day we received a ‘sugar tax’ 
that poor consumers pay to allow Ukrainian sugar industry operating. In 2004 and 2005 
this ‘tax’ was 1.86% and about 3.6% respectively. Although cutting domestic sugar 
prices to the level of world market prices would not solve the poverty problem in Ukraine, 
however, the estimated implicit taxation seems significant, especially for the poorest 
population.     
Table 11 Consequences of high sugar prices for poverty in Ukraine 
  2004 2005 
Consumers' transfer to producers, m UAH 1341.64 2583.30 
Population of Ukraine, m 47.30 46.95 
Transfers per capita, UAH 28.36 55.02 
Transfers per capita per day, UAH 0.08 0.15 
  
Poverty Line "one dollar per day":     
People affected, % of population 11.79 
Income gap ratio, % 21.13 
or =, UAH/day 4.18 4.18 
"Sugar Tax" 1.86% 3.61% 
Source: Own presentation 
4.3 Sugar price and inflation 
The inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) is a very important 
macro economic indicator for Ukraine. The relatively high rate of inflation that Ukraine 
experiences so far should not be mainly explained by monetary factors or by monetary 
policy alone (Giucci and Bilan, 2005). High protection from foreign competition seems 
                                                 
7 Handrich and Betliy (2006) 
 19
serving one of the main reasons behind the inflation problem, and sugar has been one of 
the potential triggers of inflation. 
As explained above the Ukrainian sugar market has been successfully protected from 
foreign competition, which drives a wedge between domestic and world prices. However, 
according to the sugar balance the domestic production has not been sufficient to meet 
the domestic demand. Also, the sugar demand is relatively inelastic (due to its low 
substitutability), making sugar prices very sensitive to temporarily market imbalances. 
Therefore, under the current sugar trade regime in Ukraine there is a high risk of sugar 
price jumps.      
Table 12 shows the share of sugar in the consumer basket in Ukraine. 64% consists of 
food with sugar at 2.6%. If we assume the sugar contained in confectionary goods at 
about 30%, then sugar takes up additional 0.96% (3.2%*0.3) of the consumer basket. 
Table 12 Consumers basket composition in Ukraine 
  Share of goods, % Share of group, % 
Food goods 64.0 64.0 
Sugar containing food goods:  8.0 
sugar 2.6 
confectionary 3.2 
jams, honey  0.4 
 
Other food goods  56.0 
Nonfood goods 15.5 15.5 
Services 20.5 20.5 
Source: Ministry of Economy 
Sugar accounts for approximately 3.56% of the consumer basket. This implies for 
example that a 75% increase in sugar prices (as in last summer) contributed with 2.7% 
to inflation effectively reducing the real income of the population, raising macroeconomic 
stability and food security concerns.   
4.4 Employment and social aspects 
Table 13:  Employment in the sugar factories of the EU and Ukraine 
 2003/2004 2004/2005 
Country Permanent Campaign N of 
factories 
Permanent Campaign N of 
factories 
Germany - 6778 27 - 6721 26 
France 6664 9347 34 6112 8606 30 
Poland 11079 21948 56 8807 15578 43 
Ukraine Na Na Na Na 35000-
70000 
160 
Source: Zuckerwirtschaft (2006); Notes: Na – not available 
Restructuring the sugar industry in Ukraine will inevitably lead to a significant reduction 
of employment in the industry (see the experience of EU countries in table 13), raising 
important social concerns in the sector as well as for policy makers. The analysis of this 
issue requires additional extensive studies. However, the degree of the problem might 
be scetched at this stage. 
We believe that three main points are important in this regard: 
1. The social sphere should be separated from the sugar industry. Any business 
entity cannot effectively serve the social infrustructure and be efficient and 
competitive at the same time in business, since it implies additional costs and 
leads to conflicts of interests (maximizing profits versus maximizing access to 
communities’ utilities). This is especially relevant for the sugar industry, often the 
only employer in a particular location (many district towns in Ukraine grew 
around sugar factories).  
2. Sugar beet growers should be of the least concern in this context.  Of course 
sugar beet is an important element in the crop rotation for the farmer, however 
there are other often more lucrative (see chapter 2.2 for details) and less capital 
intensive crops than sugar beet that farmers might opt for production. So one 
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should not expect significant employment and social problems with sugar beet 
growers in the course of sugar industry restructuring.  
3. The sugar industry workforce should be of the primary concern for policy makers. 
In 2005 campaign labour costs ranged from 0.08 to 0.16 man/day per each ton 
of processed sugar beet. Including all existing factories (160) we receive daily 
processing capacity of about 0.43 m tons of sugar beet. So the total estimated 
workforce employed in the sugar industry would range from 35 thd to 70 thd 
workers. If the Ukrainian sugar industry would be restructured efficiently it will 
end up with a workforce comparable to that of France or Germany, i.e. 7-8 thd 
people. About est. 28-63 thd people would loose their job. The Government 
should facilitate their efforts in finding new jobs (re-training programs, lay off 
payments). Assuming the average monthly wage at USD200 (about the level 
reported by the official statistics), about USD67-151.2 m would be required to 
pay the annual salary to those loosing thier jobs from the State Budget (or better 
from the restructuring fund proposed in the recommendations).    
5 World market trends  
From a global point of view the competiveness of sugar production is mainly influcenced 
by natural conditions (climate, soil), production efficiency in the value chain, quality of 
farm management and management of sugar processing and marketing as well as the 
availability of competitively produced raw materials. Looking at the raw material supply 
only it is commonly accepted by experts and the sugar industry that sugar production 
based on sugar cane is more competitive than sugar production based on sugar beet for 
various reasons. This is reflected by global production trends (revealed comparative 
advantages). Even with highly protected sugar beet markets world production trends 
clearly show the competiveness of cane sugar. Without protection of sugar beet 
production it would cease to exist in the long term in Europe, including Ukraine.   
 
Table 14: Global production of cane and beet sugar 
 
Year Beet sugar 
(t) 
%  Cane sugar 
(t) 
% Total      
1900/01  5,963,200 53.0  5,296,800 47.0 11,260,000 
1960/61 24,306,000 39.7 36,848,000 60.3 61,154,000 
1980/81 32,788,00 33.1 66,147,000 66.9 98,935,000 
1995/96 36,566,000 26.9 99,540,000 73.1 136,106,000 
2004/05 35,876,000 23.2 119,223,000 76.8 155,099,000 
Source: Zuckerwirtschaft  (2006)  
This production trend reveals the fundamental advantage of sugar cane and the 
fundamental dis-advantage of sugar beet. Even with highly efficient sugar beet 
production and modernised sugar factories in Europe this fact should not be overlooked 
in all policy considerations. From an economic perspective Ukraine would buy sugar on 
the world markets and phase-out sugar production based on sugar beet as raw material. 
Ukraine as a whole would benefit and become richer.  
 
The sugar world market prices have been highly volatile in the past. This is reflected in 
the following graphical presentations.  
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Figure 13: Sugar world market prices, demand and supply 
 
Source: Kirchberg, Suedzucker. 2006 
 
 
Currently, prices are relatively high due to the following factors influencing the world 
sugar balance:  
 
- 2005/2006 world production: 145 mln t (+1.5 % compared to 2004/5); 
- 2005/2006 world consumption: 149 mln t (+2 % compared to 2004/05); 
- sugar stocks are decreasing because of third deficit year; 
- decrease of exports from Brazil due to higher domestic ethanol production. 
 
The world deficit of about 4 mln t leads to rising prices. If trends persist a new balance 
would be reached in 2006/7 probably leading to price decreases. However, there are 
also strong factors leading to increased global consumption. The main demand comes a) 
from Asia, and b) from increasing ethanol production in Brazil, the most important global 
sugar producing and exporting country. It is therefore difficult to predict future sugar 
prices. It is likely that in future floor prices for sugar may be determined by fuel prices. 
On the production side, the EU sugar market reform will lead to reduced sugar 
production in the EU (minus 5 mln t are expeced; see next chapter for detailed 
explanations).  
 
What are the most likely trends? 
 
- Sugar world markets have been and will most likely continue to be volatile; 
- there are strong indications that future sugar world market prices fluctuate at a 
higher level than in the past;   
- demand from Asia and ethanol production are the most important demand 
factors; 
- EU sugar market reform will reduce sugar exports from Europe and will increase 
import opportunities to Europe 
 
6 Reform of the sugar market in the EU 
On 24th November 2005 the EU Council decided on the reform of the EU sugar market 
regime. The EU sugar market regime  set stable framework conditions for sugar and 
sugar beet producers since 1968 at a comparatively high price level compared to world 
markets. Although consumers of sugar and scientists frequently complained that 
consumers had to pay the price of the EU sugar market regime, the political influence of 
sugar and sugar beet producers was always high in Europe and ensured a stable policy 
framework for almost 40 years. This had a positive impact on investments, e.g. in 
Eastern Germany after German unification.  
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The reasons for the recent reform are due to international developments in trade and 
development negotiations. In the course of 2004 the conflict resolution panel of WTO 
decided that the EU export subsidies for sugar do not comply with WTO rules. It followed 
the reasoning and complaint of Brazil, Thailand and Australia with the following 
justification: The annual export of about 3 mln. t of not directly subsidised sugar (so-
called C sugar) is dumping because the subsided prices for sugar quota (so-called A 
sugar) are set at such a high level that these prices do not only cover the costs of A 
sugar but also the costs of C sugar. This cross subsidisation goes against WTO rules. 
WTO considers these cross-subsidies as export subsidies. Principally, export subsidies are 
not allowed (Agra Europe (2005a and 2005b), Strubenhoff and Lissitsa, 2006).  
Re-export of about 1.6 mln t of sugar from former EU colonies (so-called ACP countries)8 
will also be banned from 22nd May 2006 onwards  because these exports are considered 
as subsides of exports not allowed under WTO rules.  
Additionaly, the EU signed the agreement „Everything but Arms“ with 50 least developed  
countries. This agreement will allow participating countries to sell sugar to the EU without 
paying import duties from 2009 onwards.   
The EU had to react on these international developments aiming to reduce production by 
about 5 mln t of sugar to avoid further exports and to make the sugar sector more 
competitive in view of future sugar imports to the EU. These aims were at the end also 
acknowledged by the European sugar industry, in particular in countries with  competitive 
sugar and sugar beet production, e.g. France and Germany.  The EU will thus in future 
limit its sugar production and distribution to the domestic market.  
 
What has been decided?: 
- reduction of the sugar price by 36 % and reduction of the sugar beet price by 
39.7 % until 2009 (2006: - 20 %; 2007: - 27.5 %; 2008: - 35 %; 2009: - 36 %) 
- sugar beet farmers receive direct decoupled payments equivalent to 64.2 % of the 
price reduction based on the final price cuts 
- the quota system will be simplified by merging A and B quotas because of future 
marginal exports 
- introduction of a private sugar stock holding system and replacement of 
intervention prices by reference prices (the intervention mechanism will be 
abolished after a 4 year phase-out period) 
- restructuring support for sugar producers deciding to end sugar production 
(handing over production quota rights to the restructuring fund) with payments 
for the year of ending production (2006 and 2007: 730,- E/t; 2008: 625,- E/t; 
2009: 520,- E/t; once only!) 
- the restructuring fund is financed by a levy on holders of quota, i.e. the sugar 
industry and keeps the consumer prices at the current level for the transition 
period 
- sugar beet farmers get at least 10 % of the restructuring support to sugar 
producers 
- the volume of the restructuring fund is estimated at about 5 bln. Euro 
- sugar producers may buy sugar quota at a total volume of 1.1 mln t (maximum) 
from the restructuring fund at a price of 730 E/t 
- additional support for affected regions will be available to diversify production 
(109 E/t sugar) 
- if the restructuring fund would not get sufficient quota from the sugar industry to 
reduce production by the volume of current exports the EU will decide to introduce 
general quota cuts from the year 2010 onwards 
                                                 
8 More than 40 countries from Asia, the Caribbeans and the Pacifics (ACP) mainly former colonies of EU 
member states with privileged access to EU markets 
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- increase of isoglucose quota in three steps 
- sugar beet production will benefit from EU measures for the development of 
renewable energy (sugar for bioethanol, pharmaceutical and chemical purposes 
does not fall under the quota system) 
- the new EU sugar market regime will be valid until 2015  
Table 15: New sugar and sugar beet prices in the EU  
 before 
reform 
July 06/ 
Sept. 07 
Oct. 07/ 
Sept. 08 
Oct. 08/ 
Sept. 09 
Oct. 09/ 
Sept. 10 
Oct. 10/ 
Sept. 15 
Intervention 
/reference price (E/t 
sugar) 
 
631.9 
 
631.9 
 
631.9 
 
541.5 
 
404.4 
 
404.4 
Restructuring fund 
(E/t sugar) 
 
- 
 
126.4 
 
173.8 
 
113.3 
 
0 
 
0 
Net sugar price (E/t 
sugar) 
 
631.9 
 
505.5 
 
458.1 
 
428.2 
 
404.4 
 
404.4 
Production levy (E/t 
sugar) 
 
- 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
Sugar beet price 
(E/t sugar beet) 
 
43.6 
 
32.9 
 
29.8 
 
27.8 
 
26.3 
 
26.3 
NB: Production levy equally shared by sugar and sugar beet producers 
Source: European Commission and Suedzucker, 2006  
 
Table 16: Restructuring fund payments 
 July 06/ 
Sept. 07 
Oct. 07/ 
Sept. 08 
Oct. 08/ 
Sept. 09 
Oct. 09/ 
Sept. 10 
Oct. 10/ 
Sept. 15 
Decoupled payments (E/t 
sugar) 
 
730 
 
730 
 
625 
 
520 
 
0 
For sugar industry (E/t 
sugar) 
 
max. 657 
 
max. 657 
 
max. 562.5 
 
max. 468 
 
0 
For sugar beet growers 
(E/t sugar) 
 
min. 73 
 
min. 73 
 
min. 62.5 
 
min. 52 
 
0 
NB: Payments per ton of sold sugar  
Source: European Commission and Suedzucker, 2006  
 
What is the expected impact? 
 
According to the expectations of the European Commission and the Governments of the 
Member States it is expected that the restructuring fund will receive about 5 to 6 mln t 
of sugar quota out of a total of 17.4 t. This amount would be sufficient to avoid future 
sugar exports and to allow for increased sugar imports. The restructuring fund is 
conceived in a way that the sugar consumer prices will remain at the current level for a 
transition period of 4 years. This will strengthen the most competive sugar producers in 
the EU and it is expected that in particular regions in South and North Europe reduce 
production.  
The European Commission and the sugar industry expect that Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia will give up sugar production (source: European 
Commission, assessment report 2004 and various personal communications, 2006). 
Czech and Slovak Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Spain are expected to considerably 
reduce production. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Sweden, Great Britain are expected to marginally reduce production. The remaining 
sugar and sugar producers are forced to continuesly further increase competitiveness by 
reducing costs and increasing productivity. Production will go to the most competive 
regions and the most competitive producers.  
To ensure further stable policy framework conditions in a capital intensive industry, the 
European Commission intends to further keep the external protection level at the border 
at the level of the sugar prices in the EU. This implies that the EU has to ensure that the 
future price level of about 400,- Euro will be guaranteed by import duties and – if 
necessary – by WTO safeguard clauses.  
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Also, the European Commission intends to introduce adequeate measures to reduce 
sugar imports if the sugar imports from least developed countries would grow by more 
than 25 % per year.  
In future, further pressure on prices are likely. The Doha Round will be completed and 
another round of international trade negotiations will begin. Even with new energy 
market opportunities in sight this will not fundamentally change the economic dis-
advantage of European sugar production.  
 
7 Restructuring of the sugar sector in Eastern Germany – Lessons for 
Ukraine 
 
Following the privatisation of the sugar industry of the former GDR in 1991 the Eastern 
German sugar industry has been restructured by support of 4 West German and 1 
Danish sugar holding. The restructuring strategy has been worked out jointly by the 
Government, the German privatisation agency and the involved sugar holdings.  
 
As Eastern Germany became after German unification immediately member of the EU 
without membership negotiations, the EU sugar market regime was applied with prices 
of about 630 Euro/t sugar and about 33 Euro/t sugar beet. The sugar quota was fixed at 
847.000 t sugar and distributed mainly to the most promising regions. It is important to 
note that the sugar quota was made tradeable to allow necessary future structural 
change. 
 
The restructuring strategy had the following elements: 
 
- regional focus on most promising and competitive regions; 
- immediate closing of 15 sugar factories with further intentions to decrease the 
number of sugar factories; 
- each sugar holding concentrated on specific regions with limited overlapping; 
- investments in new sugar factories (green field investments; 10.000 – 18.000 
t/d); 
- prolongation of sugar campaign to 90 days;  
- specific investments in the sugar factory to improve technical efficiency; 
- specific investments in sugar beet production (advisory services and input 
supply); 
- introduction of modern management, marketing and costing concepts. 
 
The volume of investment has been estimated at about 1.3 bln. Euro. 170 mln. Euro 
have been provided by the German Government as a grant.  
This led to the follwowing development during the last 15 years: 
Table 17: Restructuring of the sugar industry in Germany 
 GDR 1998 East Germany 2004/5 Units 
Sugar factories 43 6  
Average capacity 1.604 10.900 t/d 
Workers 14.534 1.300  
Sugar beet yield 31.3 51.8 t/ha 
Sugar yield 4.3 8.6 t/ha 
Energy use 4.100 1.020 kWh/t sugar 
Labour productivity 43 844 t sugar/worker 
No. of sugar 
holdings 
 4  
Source: Suedzucker, Nordzucker, 2006  
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Figure 14: Location and number of sugar processing plants in Eastern Germany 
 
Source: Kirchberg, Suedzucker, 2006 
 
 
The restructuring of the sugar sector involved also important changes in sugar beet 
production. The major changes were: 
 
- Increase of number of sugar beet growers caused by the farm restructuring 
process 
- Reorganized transport of sugar beets from farms to factories by the factories 
themselves (25 t truck transport capacity, no rail transport, no farm transport) 
- Improved logistics (sugar beet storage, cleaning and handling) 
- Improved farm practices (cultivation, seeding, improved seeds, optimal use of 
fertilizers, pestices) 
- Investments in farm machinery (cultivation, seeding, spraying, harvest) 
 
These measures with considerable investments from the sugar industry in farm advisory 
services led to steadily increasing sugar beet yields.  
 
A further important aspect concerned measures in sugar distribution and marketing. 
Here, the following steps were made: 
 
- Sugar quality improvement according to EU standards 
- Introduction of western trade marks 
- Improvement of packaging 
- Broadening of product range 
- Improvement of logistics and packaging for key accounts 
 
As a result, through huge investments and know how transfer, focusing on a) 
investments in the sugar factory including green field investments, b) investments in 
raw material supply and sugar beet production, and c) investments in distribution and 
marketing increased efficiency and profitability of the East German sugar industry to a 
level that it is highly likely that it will survive the latest EU sugar market reform.  
 
What are the specific Eastern German lessons learnt for Ukraine? 
It is evident that the amount of money injected by the EU and the German Government 
into the East German sugar sector 15 years ago was based on exceptional historical 
circumstances based on political considerations rather than on economic reasoning. The 
Government of Ukraine will certainly not be able to mobilise funds in this order of 
magnitude for green-field investments.  
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8 Restructuring of the sugar sector in Poland – Lessons for Ukraine 
 
After privatisation of the sugar industry during the years 1989 to 1994 there have been 
a few years of stagnation in the Polish sugar sector before the restructuring process 
actually started. The process was supported by a clear Government strategy designed in 
2000/2001. The strategy development was partly  influcenced by EU membership 
perspectives. Part of the strategy was the invitation of foreign investors to contribute to 
the restructuring process. After implementation of the strategy the Polish sugar sector 
changed drastically during the last years. 
Table 18: The sugar sector in Poland 
  1989 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sugar factories No. 78 71 65 57 43 40 
Sugar companies No.  Na Na Na Na 5 
Campaign days days  49 67 64 77 79 
Sugar beet yield t/ha 33.2 Na Na Na Na 42.8 
Sugar yield t/ha Na 6.04 4.86 6.66 6.8 6.55 
Source: Koziolek, Nordzucker Polska, 2006; Na – not availabel 
 
The most important elements of the restructuring strategy were: 
 
- increase of production and reduction of the number of sugar factories; 
- investments in capacity (no green-field, brown-field only), storage, energy 
efficiency and quality; 
- increase of labour productivity and investments in human resource development; 
- increase of sugar beet yields 
- stable legal and policy framework 
 
The restructuring process is ongoing but it is highly likely that the Polish sugar sector 
will survive even after EU sugar market reform.  
 
What are the specific Polish lessons learnt for Ukraine?  
In the Polish case the EU membership perspective with access to the sugar market 
regime support mechanisms has been the key for mobilising funds from the public and 
private sector, including foreign direct investment, for restructuring the industry. EU 
membership is not a realistic option for the next 10 years. Also, negotiations about a 
possible EU-Ukraine Deep Free Trade Agreement will most likely exclude access to the 
EU sugar market regime.   
 
 
9 Restructuring of the sugar sector in Moldova – Lessons for Ukraine 
 
The sugar sector in Moldova went through a painful restructuring process during the last 
years. Some of the lessons learnt may be of specific importance for Ukrainian policy 
makers.  
 
After WTO accession of the Republic of Moldova in 1997 the import tariff was reduced to 
15 % leading to increased imports of raw sugar. Additonally, „grey import schemes“, 
illegal trade and erratic tax free imports of raw sugar destabilised the Moldovan sugar 
market. 
 
This was a constant concern of the Moldovan Government and the sugar industry so that 
the external protection was increased in two steps from 15 % to 35 % and further to 45 
% using WTO safeguard clauses for the second step in 2004. Furthermore, the Moldovan 
Government increased its efforts to combat illlegal trade and smuggling and set 
incentives to reduce barter trade between sugar factories and sugar beet growers.  
 
The sugar industry – including foreign investors – supported this process by the 
development of stable long-term relationships with sugar beet growers. Investments 
were made in the remaining sugar plants but also in raw material supply.  Western 
concepts of sugar distribution and marketing have been introduced to stabilise the sugar 
market.  
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In particular the investments in the whole vertical value chain from the sugar beet 
grower to the sugar processing plant to the sugar market have been important to slowly 
increase efficiency of the sugar sector in Moldova. This is reflected by the German 
investor Suedzucker supporting sugar beet growers with farm advisory services, pre-
financing of necessary inputs (seed, fertilizers, pesticides), agricultural machinery 
services and payment of sugar beets according to quality.  
Table 19: Sugar beet yields and production structures of farms producing for 
Suedzucker Moldava 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Yield t/ha 21.7 28.3 20.5 31.2 36.2 
Farms above 5 ha sugar beets  No. 605 366 282 293 229 
Farms>30t/ha sugar beet yield % 5 16 10 38 58 
Share of farms >30t/ha at total area % 11 29 19 51 66 
Highest yield t/ha 48 55 66 72 65 
Share of farms >30t/ha at total supply % 19 38 32 65 73 
Source: Mueller, Suedzucker Moldova, 2006  
It should be noted that even with heavy investments the time needed for efficiency 
gains is considerably long. Sugar beet growing is a complex enterprise. Technical as well 
as farm management issues should not be underestimated. In this view the long-term 
commitment of the investors – including foreign ones – is important to increase 
efficiency in the whole value chain.  
Table: Sugar production in Moldova 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sugar yield t/ha 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.7 3.7 6.7 
Energy 
consumption 
KWh/t 
sugar 
6069 5161 4632 4831 4464 3542 2861 
Sugar production 1000t  94.4 102.4 116.3 113.8 83 110.8 133.5 
Domestic sugar 
price 
US$/t  309 329 290 353 405 531 
Sugar  
producers 
No.  Na Na Na Na Na 2 
Sugar plants No.  Na Na Na Na Na 5 
Source: Suedzucker Moldova, 2006  
The restructuring process of the sugar sector is still ongoing but perspectives have been 
slightly improving through consolidated actions of the Moldovan Government in close 
collaboration with the Moldovan sugar industry, Moldovan sugar beet growers and 
foreign investors.  
Whether this policy is sustainable will mainly depend on future efficiency gains in the 
sector and world market developments.  
 
What are the lessons learnt from these three country cases? 
 
1. Restructuring of the sugar sector needs a clear Government strategy with 
important basic decisions on import regime, internal market regime, long-term 
support mechanisms and stability to minimise external shocks.  
2. Government, sugar industry and sugar beet growers have to work in close 
collaboration to improve the whole vertical value chain from sugar beet 
production to sugar processing, sugar distribution and marketing. 
3. If the volume of production is limited by the domestic market or international 
trade obligations the number of sugar factories has to be reduced drastically and 
the efficiency of the remaining sugar factories has to be increased rapidly.  
4. The Government has to ensure that production goes to the best locations and 
best producers to make the sector efficient.  
5. Foreign direct investment may play an important role to increase efficiency by 
investments, know how transfer and market transparancy.  
 
 28
 
 
10 Conclusions 
 
10.1 Policy options: Phasing-Out or Stability Pact? 
 
To stimulate structural change after years of stagnation of the Ukrainian sugar sector, 
policy makers in Ukraine in principle have two choices, a) to abolish import tariffs as well 
as production quota and minimum prices and allow free sugar trade and production, or 
b) to protect domestic production according to WTO negotiations and to produce sugar 
for domestic consumption only. According to WTO restrictions the second option rules 
out sugar exports since extensive export of beet sugar is not possible without export 
subsidies and Ukraine offered no recourse to export subsidies in its WTO accession 
negotiations. 
 
Following the first option would most likely lead to quickly shrinking production of sugar 
in Ukraine due to limited competiveness of beet sugar on world markets. It would 
however have the advantage of lower sugar prices for consumers. During phases of low 
world market prices the sugar industry in Ukraine would die, a few islands of production 
may survive subject to world market price fluctuations and efficiency of the remaining 
production. From an economic point of view this option would bring the highest return to 
the Ukrainian economy. However, if this economic ‚first best’ scenario would not find a 
political majority in Ukraine an alternative scenario will have to be developed. A second 
scenario would involve a strategy development process where the Government, in close 
cooperation with the sugar industry, sugar beet farmers and other relevant stakeholders 
would work out a domestic sugar sector strategy following principles of competitiveness, 
transparency, efficiency and selected investment.  
 
Both strategies would not involve green-field investments in new sugar factories but 
would make the best use of the quasi-fixed capital stock in the industry until its 
complete use and amortization.  
 
The second strategy would have the objective to produce sugar for the domestic market 
only and would provide stability to increase the efficiency of the sector. All stakeholders 
would have to agree on such a „stability pact“. 
  
The following issues would be crucial for implementation: 
 
a) external protection set by the WTO negotiation process 
 
Ukraine negotiated a Tariff Rate Quota at 260,000 tons of raw sugar imported at 2 % 
tariff from the year of Ukraine’s accession to WTO. Over-tariff quota would be 50 %.  
 
The maximum bound rate for refined sugar will be 50 % of the border price (ad 
valorem). 
 
The implementation period of the introduction of this import regime has not been 
defined yet but it is highly likely that the WTO would not accept a period exceeding a 
limited number of years.   
 
The replacement of the previous import regime (with a prohibitively fixed amount of 300 
Euro/t minimum) by the above import tax regime has important implications for the 
competitiveness of the sugar sector in Ukraine. If prices on world markets are high (as 
in 2006) this would provide a sufficient protection. However, if prices are low (as in 
2005) this regime would not be sufficient to provide effective protection for Ukrainian 
sugar production at its current low efficiency (see chapter 3 for further details). It may 
be worthwile to reconsider this issue during the negotiation process. The Russian 
variable import regime for sugar may be a model to provide effective protection even 
with high world market price fluctuations for a transition period even if not compatible 
with WTO rules in the long run. The following graphical presentation shows the import 
tariff steps for import of sugar into Russia according to the world market price. 
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Figure 15: The Russian border protection 
 Source: Rylko, 2006  
 
If the Russian model of sugar border protection cannot be re-negotiated with WTO, the 
expected tariff of 50 % will not be be sufficient for all producers to survive (see chapter 
3).  The import regime after WTO accession will increase competition and force the less 
efficient producers to make production more efficient or to go bankrupt.  
b) annual sugar consumption is estimated at about 2.1 to 2.2 mln t 
Deducting the above import of raw sugar (260.000t), annual domestic production for 
domestic consumption could be about 1.8 mln t of sugar. This is almost the current 
production. At this moment,  about 120 sugar factories are producing this annual 
volume (about 15.000 t / factory on average). In future, 30 to 40 sugar factories (with 
about 50.000 t / factory) will be sufficient  to produce for the domestic market. The 
Government will have to develop a market based mechanism to support both (i) those 
factories at sub-optimal locations to phase-out production, and (ii) those factories with 
good perspectives at good locations to upgrade their production – including sugar beet 
production - by necessary selective investments, e.g. in processing and energy 
efficiency.    
c) annual distribution of quota has to be replaced by a new transparent 
long-term mechanism reducing planning risks for investors 
The current system of annual allocation of production and import quota by the Ministry 
of Agriculture Policy increases investment risks and provides no incentives for 
investments and improvement of efficiency. It provides incentives for corruption.  
 
The first best solution would be to abolish domestic production quotas. This would lead 
to better allocation of production factors to the best regions and best producers. 
Efficiency would be most likely increase quickly. However, potential efficiency gains may 
lead to future over production of sugar beyond domestic consumption. As sugar exports 
are excluded under the currently negotiated WTO agreement a mechanism has to be 
introduced to ensure both a) rapid efficiency gains, and b) limitation of future production 
to domestic consumption.  
 
In case of continued production quotas annual allocation of quota would have to be 
replaced by a new system of long-term quota allocation. Quota have to be made 
tradeable to ensure that production goes to the most efficient producers and locations. 
According to EU experiences the first allocation may be based on a sensible reference 
period based on previous production. After the first allocation the market mechanism will 
stimulate necessary re-allocation and productivity increases.  
 
With the introduction of tradeable quota minimum prices should be abolished to speed 
up the restructuring process.  
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d) a restructuring fund should be available to support affected regions, 
factories, farmers and factory workers 
 
Similar to the implemented restructuring funds of the EU after the sugar market reform, 
a Ukrainian restructuring fund would have to be established. Funds would be provided to 
those factories deciding to phase-out production. The remaining sugar industry should 
finance this fund by a levy on sugar prices if import tariffs will remain at the 50 % level. 
This is justified because the sugar industry would benefit most of long-term stability. 
The restructuring fund would provide  incentives for rapid structural change so that 
sugar beet and sugar production goes to the most efficient locations and  producers.  
 
The order of magnitude of such a restructuring fund is estimated at USD100-200 m. This 
figure includes the annual salary compensation for workers loosing their job in the sector 
(USD67-151.2 m, see chapter 4.4 for discussion) and USD40 m to support sugar plants 
deciding to end sugar production (handing over production quota rights to the 
restructuring fund) with payments for the year of ending production at about USD40/t or 
UAH200/t. Assuming 30 factories in the sector and further assuming they produce 0.8 m 
tons of sugar, 1 m tons of sugar quota would likely be transfered to the restructuring 
fund, implying USD40 m of compensation. Combining compensation for loss of 
employment and handing over of the sugar quota the order of magnitude of 
restructuring fund payments would roughly be estimated at USD140-240 per ton of 
sugar. The necessary levy on sugar prices would be in the range of USD50 to 100 per 
ton.  
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10.2 Recommendations and necessary actions 
 
A: If the Government opts for the Phasing-Out Scenario, then the following 
recommendations are given: 
 
Recommendation A1: 
 
Reduce import tariffs in a first step to the level required by WTO, in a second step to 
zero. Abolish input tariffs on inputs (e.g. seeds). 
 
Output: Sugar available for consumers at world market prices 
 
Recommendation A2:  
 
Abolish production quotas and minimum prices. 
 
Output: Unbiased production, consumption and trade according to market principles 
 
Recommendation A3: 
 
Support competitiveness of remaining sugar beet producers and the sugar industry by 
market information and advisory services. 
 
Output: Transparent and efficient production and markets mainly reacting on world 
market opportunities 
 
Recommendation A4: 
 
Attract Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Output: Competitive and transparent investment climate and innovation 
 
Recommendation A5: 
 
Support closing of sugar factories, factory workers and sugar beet growers by 
restructuring fund. 
 
Output: Accelerated structural change and social protection 
 
This Phasing-Out Scenario would produce the highest return for the Ukrainian economy 
as a whole by improved allocation of production factors, rapid structural change and 
closing of inefficient sugar factories. At the same time it would make surviving producers 
more competitive, agile and strong.  
 
B: If the Government opts for the Stability Pact Scenario, then the following 
recommendations are given: 
 
Recommendation B1: 
 
Initiate discussion process with relevant stakeholders (sugar industry, sugar beet 
growers, Government, consumers associations) to develop „stability pact“ for the sugar 
sector. Make the discussion process transparent and publish results in a Government 
strategy document. Make the results binding for all stakeholders for a period of at least 
five years. 
 
Output: Sugar development strategy document  
 
Recommendation B2: 
 
Assess impact of external protection mechanism after WTO accession. Adapt import 
regime according to the Russian model to ensure sufficient protection if world market 
prices are low. 
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Output: Revised import tariff regime for a transition period after WTO accession 
 
Recommendation B3: 
 
Abolish production quotas 
Or  
Replace annual domestic production quota distribution for sugar and sugar beets by 
transparent and efficient long-term quota allocation. Make the quota tradeable to 
increase productivity in the value chain.  Abolish minimum prices.  
 
Output: Long-term quota allocation of tradeable quota 
 
Recommendation B4: 
 
Design and implement restructuring fund providing funds for closing of sugar factories. 
Define priority regions, timing and distribution mechanism. Funds should be provided by 
the remaining sugar industry to those sugar companies deciding to phase-out production 
(including sugar beet growers and factory workers) similar to the recently established 
EU mechanism. The order of magnitude of such a fund is estimated at USD100-200 m. 
 
Output: Restructuring fund financed by the sugar industry 
 
Recommendation B5: 
 
Reduce import tariffs for necessary inputs, e.g. sugar beet seeds, to improve production. 
 
Output: Higher input quality and sugar beet production efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Aurthors: Oleg Nivyevskiy, Heinz-Wilhelm  Strubenhoff 
Lektor: Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel 
Date: 3rd May 2005 
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ANNEX A: Methodology used description 
A.1 KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATION 
In this paper we estimate unknown distributions of random variables — sugar beet 
yields, efficiency scores, gross margins, campaign days etc. For this, we use ROSENBLATT 
(1956) kernel-based estimate of unknown univariate density function ( ),f u  of a random 
variable ,u  from the sample or realizations of ,u },...,1:{ nju j = , defined as 
1
1ˆ ( ) ( ) ,
n
j
j
u u
f u K
n h h=
−= ∑  
where K is a kernel function (e.g. Gaussian density in our case) and h is the bandwidth.  
The obtained density estimates were plotted for visual presentation and comparison of 
distributions.   
A.2 EFFICIENCY CHARACTERIZATIONS 
Assume n firms operate in a region r (r=1,…,R) at question. Each firm k (k=1,..., rn ) in 
region r uses N inputs, denoted with NkN
kk xxx +ℜ∈= )',...,( 1 , to produce M outputs, 
denoted with MkM
kk yyy +ℜ∈= )',...,( 1 . We assume that within a region, all n firms have 
access to the same technology rT , defined in general terms as  
{( , ) : }, 1,...,rT x y x can produce y r R≡ =                         (1) 
that satisfies standard regularity axioms of production theory (e.g. see FÄRE, GROSSKOPF 
AND LOVELL (1994). Technology is allowed to differ between regions. Under these axioms 
we can use the output oriented SHEPHARD’S  (1970) distance function 
1: { }r N MoD + + +ℜ ×ℜ →ℜ ∪ ∞ , defined as  
( , ) inf{ : ( , / ) }r roD x y x y Tθ θ≡ ∈                                          (2) 
to completely characterize technology set rT of region r. This distance function can be 
used to define Farrell-type output oriented technical efficiency measure for firm k  
( , ) 1/ ( , )r k k r k koTE x y D x y≡                                                  (3) 
Whenever we state that ( , ) 1r k koD x y =  or ( , ) 1r k kTE x y = , we assert that firm k is 
technically efficient relative to frontier of region r, otherwise, when ( , ) 1r k kTE x y > , it is 
technically inefficient.  For convenience, one can represent efficiency score of a firm k in 
percentages, i.e. ( )1 ( , ) *100%r k kTE x y  and its inefficiency score would then be 
( )1 1 ( , ) *100%r k kTE x y− . While aggregating individual efficiencies into the sub-group or 
group levels within a region we accounted for contribution of particular firm in total group 
(region) score (FÄRE AND ZELENYUK, 2003). In particular, their aggregate efficiency for sub-
group l is obtained as  
, , ,
1
( , )l
l n l k l k l k
k
TE TE x y S=≡ ⋅∑ , l
kl
kl
Yp
py
S
,
, ≡ , ,
1
, 1,...,lnl l k
k
Y y l L== =∑     (4) 
By the same manner, the aggregate efficiency score for entire group (i.e., aggregated 
over all the sub-groups of a region) is given by 
l
L
l
l
STETE ⋅= ∑
=1
,            ∑ == Ll lll YpYpS 1/                                (5) 
Particularly for our study, this formula tells us that technical efficiency for region’s 
production of sunflower seeds is obtained by averaging the group efficiencies over all 
enterprises (regions) with weights being the shares of each firm in total regional 
revenue.  It is worthwhile to note that for a single-output case (as ours), the weights 
become the corresponding output-shares. 
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A.3 DEA (DATA ENVELOPE ANALYSIS) ESTIMATION 
The technology set rT for each region r (r=1,…,R) is unobservable but can be (under 
certain assumptions) consistently estimated using Activity Analysis Model, with the 
following set 
{
}
1 1 1
( , ) : ; ; 1; 0;
1,..., ; 1,..., ; 1,..., ; 1,...,
r rn n n
r k k
k m k i k k
k k k
r
T x y y z y x z x z z
k n m M i N r R
= = =
≡ ≤ ≥ = ≥
= = = =
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          (6)   
The boundary of this set defines what is called the observed ‘best-practice frontier’.  Such 
approximation of the true technology can be done for each region and then the individual 
efficiency can be estimated relative to the observed best practice frontier of the 
corresponding region.  In particular, solving the following linear programming problem  
{
}
1, ,..., 1 1 1
ˆ ( , ) max : ; ; 1; 0;
1,..., ; 1,..., ; 1,...,
r r r
K
n n n
r j j j k j k
k m k i k kZ Z k k k
r
TE x y y z y x z x z z
k n m M i N
Θ = = =
≡ Θ Θ ≤ ≥ = ≥
= = =
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   (7) 
for each observation (firm) 1,...,j n=  in the sample gives estimate of technical efficiency 
for the particular firm j.  The estimates of aggregate efficiency scores are obtained by 
replacing (in formulas (3) and (4)) the unknown individual technical efficiency scores 
with their DEA estimates. 
ANNEX B: Description of the calculations used to build Figures 15-
16 from chapter 3 
The idea behind the presentations is based upon the formulas:  
Pdi=(1+VATi)*(1+ImpTi)*EXi*Pw+MktCi                                     (1) 
Or 
Pdi= (1+VATi)* EXi *Pw+(MktCi+ImpTi)                                                        (2) 
where Pdi- domestic price, ImpTi – import tariff, VATi – value added tax, EXi – exchange 
rate, Pw – world price, MktCi – marketing and transport costs. The first equation applies 
to the Figure 16, since after Ukraine joints WTO it will have 50% import tariff, thus it 
must be calculated from the world market price. The second equation applies to the 
Figure 15, since now Ukraine has EUR300/t specific import tariff.    
As long as Pdi<=VATi*ImpTi*EXi*Pw+MktCi the import of sugar good is not profitable, 
thus the domestic industry stays competitive.  
Based on historical data we learned that sugar world market prices did not fall below 
USD187/t over the last 20 years (see World Bank and OECD, 2004). Therefore, this price 
constitutes the lower bound for the world market price in both figures.  
On the other hand we have chosen the EU sugar reference price for 2009-10 (EUR404/t 
or appr. UAH2465/t) as the lower bound for the Ukrainian domestic sugar price. From our 
point of view there are at least two arguments in favour of this. The  EU Commissions’ 
decision was based on detailed  calculations justifying EU sugar industry competitiveness 
at that price level. So, we assume that this price may serve as a reference and 
achievable point for Ukraine. Moreover, according to the Ukrtsukor Association data, the 
minimum sugar production costs were at USD356/t or UAH1816/t. So adding marketing 
costs and reasonable margins we deduct the same order of magnitude, i.e. UAH2465/t.      
ANNEX C: Database and sugar beet profitability descriptions 
The analysis of the sugar beet sector is done using enterprise level data provided by 
Derzhkomstat (Ukrainian Statistics Committee). The database covers agricultural enterprises 
operating in 2004. The data were “cleaned” for missing data, possible outliers and nonsensical 
data, producing a cross-section of 3546 agricultural enterprises. Data available  for  sugar beet 
production includes Production cost, Land used, Labor employed (man-hours), Output, and 
Revenue. Unfortunately, we cannot extract the quantity or the value of each particular input 
used in production. However, according to the database description we have the list of inputs 
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included into the production cost calculations. Table 14 shows the list of inputs accounted in 
the production cost calculations, as well as  gross margin calculations.   
Table 14 Presentation of gross margin calculations 
+ Sales revenue 
+ Per hectare subsidies 
+= Revenue 
- Seed costs 
- Fertilizer costs 
- Pesticides and herbicides costs  
- Machinery costs (seeding, production, and harvest) 
- Transport costs 
- Interest payments on short-term credits 
- Labor costs 
-= Gross value of inputs 
= Gross margin 
Source: Own presentation 
 The estimation of efficiency scores employed one output (Output in tons) and two inputs 
(Gross value of inputs and Land used) model.  
 
The analysis of sugar industry performance was based upon the database collected from 
different sources – Ukragroconsult, Ukrtsukor, and Zuckerwirtschaft (2006).  
